Introduction

In the contemporary landscape, security considerations extend beyond the traditional focus solely on the state. Non-state actors and transnational challenges, like drug trafficking, present formidable threats. The economic ramifications of drug trafficking are considerable, disrupting the functionality of economic systems and impacting the conditions essential for state sovereignty (Engvall, 2006).

Central Asia holds geopolitical significance due to its rich energy resources and strategic location, bordered by major powers like Russia, China, and India. Experts view modern Central Asia as an arena for geopolitical competition reminiscent of the 19th-century Great Game, with global powers vying for influence (Rakhimov, 2015). This makes it a focal point for global powers seeking influence and control over energy resources and capital flows (Campi, 2018).

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the former Union republics gained independent sovereignty under international law. However, discussions on historical grievances underscore a continued reliance on Russia among these newly sovereign states, akin to the dependency seen in former Western colonies on their imperial powers (Atkin, 2011).

In both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the ruling elites heavily rely on informal networks and various income sources to maintain their power. For example, leasing land to foreign powers, such as hosting military bases, provides income for these elites (Ash, 2021). Both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan encounter challenges stemming from their reliance on various foreign powers, including Russia, the United States, European states, and China (Ash, 2021).

Furthermore, migration patterns underwent significant shifts, with Russia emerging as a magnet for migrants from the ex-Soviet territories. Additionally, ethnic elites exploit census data to legitimize their power, sparking debates over ethnic categorization. This discrepancy fuels widespread distrust of the state (Dominique, 2002). Public officials are perceived as corrupt and self-serving, rather than serving the public interest Citizens lose confidence in the government’s ability to represent and safeguard their interests. In Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, pervasive corruption has engendered widespread disillusionment, manifesting in protests, unrest, and challenges to the state’s legitimacy (Dominique, 2002).

Corruption in post-Soviet Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan has inflicted profound damage on state sovereignty, undermining institutions, fostering citizen distrust, and hampering effective governance (Atkin, 2011). This essay explores influence of corruption across various sectors, spanning from politics to the economy, and its impact on state sovereignty.

Concepts of Sovereignty

In the post-Soviet era, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan grappled with democratization and economic reforms. This paper critically examines various definitions, such as Stephen Krasner’s perspectives on sovereignty. His concept can be broken down into four categories: interdependence sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and international legal sovereignty (Moore, 2009).

The concept of sovereignty was first introduced by  Bodin in the 16th century.  He emphasized how legal supremacy is tied to policymaking, contrasting with subsequent interpretations Weber, who provided “thin” views of sovereignty centred on ideas like the monopoly of violence. Despite Krasner’s emphasis on state authority, his view oversimplifies sovereignty’s original complexity, such as Weber’s (Moore, 2009).

This concept is part of the Copenhagen School, which had a significant impact on the field of security studies, revolutionizing the conceptualization of security to encompass a wide array of emerging threats such as migration, transnational crime, and intrastate conflicts. Additionally, concepts like sectoral security highlight how different sectors interact to shape security challenges, while regional security complex theory explores how regional interactions impact security perceptions and behaviours. Traditionally, security analyses were predominantly state-centric, primarily concentrating on military threats. (Wilkinson, 2007).

However, the attempt to create a universal security framework is Eurocentric, leading to a skewed understanding of security dynamics in non-Western contexts where societal norms differ. This critique aligns with Foucault’s idea, that discourses shape reality and marginalize alternative knowledge (Wilkinson, 2007). Furthermore, Weber’s concept of the “iron cage” (Wilkinson, 2007) of rationalization is applicable to this case, where Western ideas constrain other perspectives (Wilkinson, 2007).

Thus, Darden’s concept of graft concerning the state seems more suitable. He proposes that even a state heavily dependent on graft for compliance can still demonstrate Weberian traits of statehood, such as a monopoly on violence, hierarchy, impersonality, and efficacy in coercion and extraction (Darden, 2008).

Utilizing all theories to examine Tajikistan’s sovereignty dynamics, suggests that Tajikistan’s deference to Russia in security matters challenges conventional sovereignty concepts. Rather than focusing solely on territorial control, Tajikistan prioritizes population control, reflecting Foucault’s idea of biopower (Scarborough, 2022). Additionally, the Copenhagen School’s regional analysis approach may oversimplify security dynamics, particularly evident in the case of Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution, where local complexities are overlooked (Wilkinson, 2007).  The empirical critique of the framework, by using the government overthrow in 2005, exposes its shortcomings and underscores the necessity for heightened awareness of local dynamics (Wilkinson, 2007).

The Soviet Legacy and its Consequences

Historically  both countries played peripheral roles in the Soviet economy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union marginalized in the Soviet economy, countries in the region remain reliant on Russia for economic sustenance, lacking viable alternatives (Ash, 2021). Tajikistan’s close security ties with Russia trace back to the chaotic post-Soviet transition, notably during the Tajik Civil War (Scarborough, 2022). Despite challenges such as a lack of clear strategy and a reactive approach to external developments, Russia remains a key player in regional security and economic cooperation (Rakhimov, 2015). The debate over whether the Soviet Union was an empire is complex and often contentious, ultimately coming to the consensus that the relationship between the central government and non-Russian republics had imperial-colonial characteristics toward the end of the Soviet era (Atkin, 2011).

The significant authority is still held by communist elites in Central Asian countries, operating above the law and maintaining a culture of impunity that persists today (Karklins, 2007). For example, the post-Soviet reliance on rent income in Central Asia influences these countries’ foreign policies and relationships with external powers (Ostrowski, 2011). This example is part of the rentier state concept, where the economy relies heavily on rents derived mainly from the sale of oil, gas, or other resources on international markets. These rents are controlled by a small elite and play a central role in distributing wealth to the population. Central Asian countries exhibit varying degrees of dependency on rent income, either from oil and gas exports, labour remittances, international aid, or leasing access to territory (Ostrowski, 2011).

The collapse of the Soviet Union brought strict regulations which created shadow economies where illegal activities thrived due to limited legal opportunities (Lotspeich, 1995). The rapid mass privatization of state-owned enterprises in post-communist countries during the early 1990s coincided with a notable increase in organized crime (Earle & Gellbach, 2010). This catalysed Central Asia’s transformation into a pivotal conduit for drug trafficking, with approximately 30 percent of Afghan heroin traversing the region to markets in Russia and Eastern Europe (De Danieli, 2014). Economically, the drug trade disrupts the functionality of the economic system, hampering the state’s ability to collect taxes and provide essential services. In terms of security, the drug trade poses a threat to territorial sovereignty when combined with violent armed groups. While drug trafficking itself may not directly challenge a state’s territorial integrity, its association with violent factions can destabilize regions and undermine state authority (Engvall, 2006).

Nowadays, populism becomes influential in this area due to uncertain geopolitics and entrenched patronage networks, serving as a potent tool for political mobilization. Post-Soviet states differ from Baltic and Central Asian ones because of their unclear geopolitics and prevalent patronage systems, which foster distinct populist movements. Sovereigntism defends against foreign threats to “the people,” while anti-corruption efforts tackle cronyism to drive societal progress (Hoppe, 2022).

Drug trafficking might not always present an immediate threat to a nation’s security and stability; in fact, it can sometimes function to stabilize the political system and maintain order (Engvall, 2014). In Central Asia, despite its significant role in heroin trafficking, there’s a surprising absence of high levels of violence, prompting suspicions of state collusion with traffickers (Marat, 2022). It’s important to interpret seizures and arrests carefully, as they may not only signal corruption but also result from political or criminal rivalries within governmental circles (Engvall, 2014). The relatively low violence levels in Central Asia could be attributed to robust law enforcement efforts or the absence of intense competition among criminal factions controlling drug trafficking (Marat, 2022).

When corruption becomes informally institutionalized, it can enhance the efficiency of state organizations in activities like tax collection, upholding public order, and quelling political dissent. However, this strengthening of administrative hierarchies may hinder the advancement of liberal politics and the establishment of democratic institutions (Darden, 2008). This can be viewed as weak state capacity, contributing to a sense of insecurity among individuals, leading them to seek alternative security measures. In situations where the state fails to provide adequate security, people may turn to informal ethnic security organizations for protection. Chauvinist rhetoric can exploit these feelings of insecurity to garner support for violence against other ethnic groups, particularly among individuals feeling insecure due to state weakness (Ash, 2021).

Exposure to nationalist rhetoric that promotes ethnic superiority can strengthen support for violence against other ethnic groups. For instance, the breakdown of state authority during the 2010 ethnic violence in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, heightened the impact of chauvinist rhetoric and raised the risk of ethnic violence (Ash, 2021).

The State-Crime Nexus

Corruption thrives on a system of mutual protection among the corrupt and powerful, where the fear of exposing compromising information prevents individuals from revealing each other’s misdeeds (Karklins, 2007). The symbiotic bond between organized crime and the state in Tajikistan has increasingly institutionalized since the conclusion of the civil war, prompting  a nexus between drugs and the state (Engvall, 2014). This intertwined relationship between drug traffickers and political-economic elites, highlights the blurred lines between state institutions and criminal networks (De Danieli, 2014).

The “vory v zakone” (Cowley & et al, 2015),  defy traditional ideas of legality by functioning within the state’s legal framework while conducting criminal operations, effectively blurring the line between legal and illegal activities. These consist of an elite group of professional criminals within the organized crime world, prevalent in most Post-Soviet States. Rather than being in opposition, the state and criminal groups shape each other through governance practices. The vory v zakone appropriate many state functions and methods, establishing multiple legal spheres within the state (Cowley & et al, 2015).

Contrary to the conventional belief that corruption signifies the breakdown of the state, corruption can reinforce the administrative hierarchies of the state under certain circumstances (Darden, 2008). Moreover, corruption nurtures a culture of dependence on external actors, compromising state sovereignty. In the absence of effective governance, foreign entities, including international organizations and foreign investors, often wield considerable influence over decision-making processes. This external meddling undermines the state’s autonomy and sovereignty, perpetuating a cycle of dependence and vulnerability (Cooper, 2008).

Combating corruption can be accomplished through several categories.  Firstly, decentralizing decision-making could limit discretionary powers and enhance accountability. Secondly, citizens need to understand the benefits of adhering to formal rules, individually and collectively. This requires dispelling the perception that corruption is a lucrative and low-risk activity. While individuals contribute to corruption, institutional frameworks also shape behaviour. Both must be addressed. However, freeing a state of corruption seems impossible once it reached a certain threshold (Karklins, 2007).

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as Case Studies

Tajikistan serves as a case study illustrating both the impoverished condition of the Soviet Union’s periphery and the extent of its militarization ( Atkin, 2011). It is notably one of the post-Soviet states most profoundly affected by organized crime, driven by three main factors: the severe weakness of its state institutions, its proximity to Afghanistan and the prolonged civil war from 1992 to 1997 (Engvall, 2014). The illicit drug trade remains deeply entrenched within the highest levels of state power, merging state and criminal interests. Tajikistan’s contemporary political economy is characterized by a complex interplay among state institutions, organized crime, and the drug trade (Engvall, 2014).

Tajikistan’s security institutions, formed during the chaos of the Soviet breakup and civil war, have maintained strong connections with Russian counterparts. This alignment with Russia has also raised concerns about Tajikistan’s sovereignty, as it has ceded authority in various domains (Scarborough, 2022). Despite this, Tajikistan has managed to maintain control over its population, reflecting modern sovereignty concepts that prioritize governance over territorial dominance. This suggests that Tajikistan’s security stance reflects the concept of  sovereignty which is  defined by international connections rather than territorial boundaries. Tajikistan as a case study exemplifies a shift in global sovereignty dynamic (Scarborough, 2022).

The idea is that Tajikistan’s willingness to let Russia take the lead in security matters questions traditional views of sovereignty, as described by Weber. Sovereignty usually means having ultimate control over one’s territory. However, Tajikistan’s cooperation with Russia in security suggests a focus on controlling its people rather than just its land (Scarborough, 2022).

Kyrgyzstan, once seen as a success story in Central Asia for its openness, liberalism, and reform-minded approach in the early 1990s, experienced a decline in its reputation by the early 2000s. The democratization process faltered due to internal scandals and a drift towards authoritarianism. Economic difficulties, including a substantial foreign debt and widespread criminalization of the economy, contributed to this decline (Madi, 2004).

The concept of statehood in Kyrgyzstan is viewed as fragile, shaped by the daily practices of citizens, bureaucrats, and politicians, challenging conventional notions of statehood as a preexisting entity. In Kyrgyzstan, formal, informal, and customary laws coexist, resulting in a pluri-legal system. Law in Kyrgyzstan is perceived in the academic discourse as a product of culture, political contention, and historical circumstances, leading to the recognition of legal pluralism (Cowley & et al, 2015). Despite the disorder and instability surrounding criminal activities within the penal system, there exists a functional governance model within for example the prison system, which  defies conventional understandings of law and sovereignty (Cowley & et al, 2015).

Kyrgyzstan has a historical background in opium cultivation, trafficking, and consumption, with a significant role in supplying legal opium to the Soviet Union during the 19th century. Although opium addiction reached alarming levels in neighbouring China, Kyrgyzstan, integrated into the Soviet Union, did not experience widespread addiction. Currently, Kyrgyzstan is not a major producer or consumer of hard drugs but serves as a transit territory for Afghan opioids bound for Russia and Western Europe (Madi, 2004).

Drug trafficking, especially heroin from Afghanistan, poses a significant threat to Kyrgyzstan, with most intercepted opiates entering through its southern regions. Corruption among law enforcement officers, border guards, and state officials exacerbates the issue, as drug traffickers often operate under their protection (Madi, 2004). Money laundering further complicates the problem, with organized criminal groups seeking to launder illegal proceeds through complex financial operations and investments in legal enterprises. Weak regulations and law enforcement mechanisms in Central Asian states make them vulnerable to money laundering activities, hindering their transition to democracy and stable governance (Madi, 2004).

Understanding the implications of the drug trade for Tajikistan’s national security requires considering various dimensions, including economic, environmental, military, political, and societal sectors, as opposed to a solely state-centric and military-focused approach. Analysing the interplay between theoretical frameworks and empirical findings regarding Tajikistan’s national security sheds light on the state’s legitimacy, cohesion, and resilience against threats posed by the drug trade (Engvall, 2006). Initially, drug trafficking in Tajikistan was relatively unorganized, involving individuals or small groups. However, as the drug trade expanded, medium-sized trafficking groups emerged, eventually evolving into large-scale organized crime groups. These influential groups, deeply embedded within the political system, collaborate closely with law enforcement agencies, allowing them to traffic significant quantities of heroin with minimal consequences (Engvall, 2014). In summary, drug trafficking, corruption, and money laundering pose substantial challenges to Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s stability and development, jeopardizing its political legitimacy and economic growth (Madi, 2004).

Conclusion

The historical context provided in the essay sheds light on Tajikistan’s  on Kyrgyzstan’s current security stance and its implications for sovereignty. Furthermore, the essay places these countries experience within the broader context of post-Soviet transitions and the emergence of post-Soviet sovereignty models (Scarborough, 2022).

In essence, underdevelopment and geographical factors solidify Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s ties to Russia for the foreseeable future, influencing their economic and political trajectories. These dynamics resonate with the concept of rentier states, where elites derive significant revenue from external sources, maintaining power and stability through informal networks and economic dependencies (Ash, 2021). The lack of economic diversification and reliance on rent income present challenges for sustainable development and political stability in these countries (Ostrowski, 2011).

Nations such as China, Russia, and India are actively implementing soft power initiatives to promote their cultural and civilizational ideals across the Eurasian continent. These initiatives aim to enhance their global image and foster continental integration (Campi, 2018). Russia has historically wielded significant cultural and political influence in Central Eurasia. Russia is turning its focus towards Asia to maintain its sway in the region, evident in initiatives such as the Eurasian Economic Union and the Russkiy Mir Foundation (Campi, 2018). The promotion of soft power, which includes cultural and educational policies, serves as a means for nations to assert their civilizational experiences and ideologies. While this approach has the potential to bolster continental integration, it also carries the risk of confrontation if not managed effectively (Campi, 2018).

In conclusion, the paper highlights that post-Soviet ideological constructs centred on concepts like great-power status, sovereigntism, and military glorification are primarily associated with Russia. However, these ideas resonate across the wider region, contributing to the diverse landscape of post-Soviet states (Hoppe, 2022). Efforts by powerful nations or international bodies to reshape weaker states often face unforeseen obstacles and resistance. Despite investing substantial resources and demonstrating strong determination, achieving complete control over outcomes is improbable (Cooper, 2008).

Widespread criminal activity in Central Asia contributes to uncertainty, reduces social productivity, and hinders economic development by discouraging investment and prompting migration. While establishing stability in the rule of law is crucial for reducing crime rates, transitioning to a more liberalized economic regime requires significant changes in legal and regulatory frameworks to address the underlying causes of criminal behaviour (Lotspeich, 1995).

In summary, corruption poses a significant threat to state sovereignty in post-Soviet Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. It undermines trust in government institutions, weakens the rule of law, distorts the economy, and fosters dependency on external actors. Combatting corruption requires comprehensive reforms to strengthen institutions, promote transparency and accountability, and restore public trust. Only through such efforts can Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan regain their sovereignty and develop more resilient and prosperous societies (Gullette & Heathershaw, 2015).

Moreover, the concept of the sovereignty must be redefined, with an emphasize on the role of emotions, particularly fear. In the 1990s nationalist leaders capitalized on fears of losing control, framing sovereignty as closely tied to ethnic values and ideals. This emotional framing shapes sovereignty as both an international and popular institution. Identity and sovereignty are intertwined in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, contrasting with Western multi-ethnic conceptions (Gullette & Heathershaw, 2015). Fixed views of sovereignty should be revised, focusing on exploring the emotional connections between individual identity and national sovereignty (Gullette & Heathershaw, 2015).

Corruption related to drugs has a profound impact on the operational integrity of the state. Organized crime embeds itself within state systems, siphoning resources meant for public welfare towards private agendas, exacerbating economic volatility (Engvall, 2014). To reduce the risk of ethnic violence in vulnerable states, policies should concentrate on building trust in formal security sources and dispersing homogeneous ethnic networks. Robust state institutions play a crucial role in easing tensions among ethnic groups and averting violence, particularly in environments marked by ethnic divisions (Ash, 2021). The fusion of state entities with criminal syndicates underscores the urgency of addressing this issue.

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